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THE INTERNATIONAL FIRM AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS
EBERHARD GUNTHER*
I
In modem industrialized economies we observe a considerable growth
of firms which is mostly due to mergers, the establishment of joint ventures
or other kinds of affiliations or cooperation. The firms involved are mostly
large themselves and, consequently, a merger or some kind of cooperation
produces giants which frequently dominate the respective home markets
and play an important part on the world market.
Two countries in particular have become known for the number of
mergers accomplished in recent years which are frequently fostered by the
respective governments, i.e., Japan and France. In Japan concentration is
largely due to the resurgence of the Zaibatsu, the powerful family enter-
prises. They had been dissolved after the war but in the fifties and especially
the sixties the parts of the Zaibatsu came together again.1 Today the old
family control does not exist any more, but the traditions, reputation,
cohesion and other implications of names and trademarks continue to
exist and to hold ,the firms together. Examples are the Mitsubishi, Mitsui
and Sumitomo concerns. The most recent merger between the two steel
giants, Yawata and Fuji, which has created the world's second biggest steel
producer, is but another example of this development. Both enterprises
were parts of the steel monopoly Nihon Seitetsu and were dissolved after
the war.
The French government has repeatedly declared its intention to estab-
lish a powerful group of enterprises in every branch of the industry which
could effectively compete on the world market. Examples are the mergers
between the steel manufacturer Ugine and the nitrogen producer Soci~t6
des Produits Azots, and, within the steel industry, the mergers between
Usinor and Lorraine-Escaut, and between de Wendel, Sidelor, and the
Soci& Mosellane de Sid~rurgie. Groups were further formed by Saint
Gobain and Pont L Mousson and by Rh6ne-Poulenc and Pechiney, Ugine-
Kuhlmann, and Naphtachimie. Finally, the mergers between the car manu-
facturers Renault and Peugeot and in the electrical industry between the
Companie Gn6rale d'Electricit6 and Thomson-Brandt may be mentioned.
Increases in business concentration occurred to a lesser extent in other
President, Federal Cartel Office, Berlin, Germany.
For a detailed description of this development, see generally Zaibatsu Revival?
(pt 1), 26 THE ORIENTAL ECON. 633 (1958); Zaibatsu Revival? (pts. 2-9), 27 THE ORIENTAL
ECON. 10, 65, 122, 178, 241, 348, 412, 461 (1959); Zaibatsu Leadership Race (pts. 1-5), 29
THE ORIENTAL ECON. 73, 141, 199, 259, 350 (1961).
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countries. In Germany the Badische Anilin und Sodafabriken (BASF) and
Wintershall have formed a combine in the chemical industry. In the steel
industry the two combines, Thyssen and Mannesmann, agreed to divide their
field of production with Mannesmann specializing in pipes and Thyssen in
rolled steel. Joint ventures were set up by Siemens and AEG for the produc-
tion of transformers and turbines and by Siemens and Bosch for electrical
household appliances.
With the growth of an enterprise its scope becomes wider and its
interests stretch farther. Finally, we find the international firm which is
active in a number of countries and which often has a world-wide network
of plants, offices, branches, divisions etc.
Wertheimer 2 distinguished between five stages of this development: in
the national stage a company has production and sales only within the
home country. This is followed by the next stage during which the enter-
prise begins to sell abroad directly to the customers or through intermedi-
aries. This would be followed by the establishment of foreign sales offices
which in turn may result in the creation of plants and lastly in the estab-
lishment of a full line subsidiary or operating company.
In this way an international firm has come into existence which has to
face new problems both inside and outside. The inside problems concern
mainly questions of organization and location of the decision-making power.
A centralized organization in one city -often in the country in which the
firm originated- has the advantage that all decisions can be made in one
place which receives the information from all places of activity and which
is, therefore, in the best position to make decisions. On the other hand, the
disadvantages are clearly visible. A central directing organ may be too far
away from the place where a decision needs to be made and, despite all the
information available, may not be able to take into account all the perti-
nent and often intangible implications involved. Also, it may be that the
employees in the foreign branches dislike the idea that they have to take
orders from a foreign head office.
It seems appropriate therefore that an international firm should give
its foreign branches greater responsibility with the degree of their growth.
An example might be the Ford Motor Company which had established a
European central office in London in 1967. This office was to serve as an
intermediary between the head office in Detroit and the branches in the
single European countries and was thus set up as a further means of decen-
tralization. In the majority of cases as much decentralization as possible
seems to be indicated, because it allows a greater degree of flexibility of
the single national branches and stimulates the initiative of the responsible
employees.
2 The International Firm and International Aspects of Policies on Mergers, Lecture
by E. Wertheimer, International Conference on Monopolies, Mergers and Restrictive
Practices, Cambridge, England, SepL 1969.
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How far decentralization can go differs in each firm and depends on a
number of factors: for example, a greater degree of central planning is
necessary in cases where the single branches are interdependent with regard
to the manufacture and supply of certain components of the final products.
There may further be a greater dependence on a central office in industries
in which research which may best be conducted in a central laboratory, if
only for the reason to avoid double work, is important. Of course, we must
not overlook an important factor which is based on the attitude of the top
management. It is in their discretion how much or how little independence
the foreign branches are to have and this again depends on the mentality of
the top managers and the degree of confidence in the local management.
The outside problems are based on the fact that the international firm
has to cope with different languages, different legal provisions, and different
attitudes of the governments in the host countries. Of these, the attitude of
the respective government would seem the most important factor to be
considered. It is influenced by a variety of factors such as the actual con-
dition of its own economy or its balance of payments situation. It may differ
in cases where a domestic enterprise enters a foreign market, be it through
the establishment of new sales outlets or through the acquisition of a firm
which already exists in the foreign country by way of direct investment or
merger, and it may differ in cases where a foreign firm enters the domestic
market.
In general, a country will adopt a positive attitude towards a domestic
company which enters a foreign market if its balance of payments situation
is healthy, i.e., if the flow of money into another country has no serious
effects on it. It will also be regarded as a positive factor that this is a step
which adds to the wealth of the company and thus, indirectly, to the wealth
of the country. On the other hand, the attitude will be negative in countries
with balance of payments problems, or may become negative when, in the
course of time, the trend of the domestic enterprises to go into foreign
markets becomes too pronounced and thus, finally, affects even a country
with an originally sound balance of payments.3
Similarly, there are the two sides of the coin with respect to a foreign
firm entering the domestic market. Countries will be in favor of such new
investments if they thereby gain access to new technologies and know-how,
and if their employment situation is improved.4 This may be true first of
all for the developing countries, but even the highly developed countries
of the western world are aware of these advantages. The Canadian Watkins
Report5 states in this connection that this "package of product, technology,
$For instance the United States adopted in 1965 a Voluntary Balance of Payments
Program under which American enterprises voluntarily limited the amount of funds for
foreign direct investments. In 1968 the Foreign Direct Investment Program followed which
brought mandatory controls over private investments abroad.
4 See G. MEIER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 94 (1963).
5REPORT OF THE TAsK FORCE ON THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY, FOREIGN
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management, capital and market access brings with it large potential bene-
fits for the host country."6 On the other side we find a xenophobia in
countries with a strongly nationalistic attitude7 which may even develop in
countries which are basically open to foreign enterprises wanting to enter
the domestic market.8 Further, a government may fear that the foreign firm
is too strong a competitor for the domestic firms on the home market, or
that the foreign firm might ignore or even counteract the economic policy
of the domestic government.9
Despite all these difficulties, more and more firms become international.
This involves special problems for antitrust enforcement. Some national
antitrust laws provide for an international application of their regulations.
Thus, sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 10 refer to conspiracies and mo-
nopolization in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or
with foreign nations. This position was interpreted by Judge Learned Hand
in the famous Alcoa case" to mean that it is possible to impose liabilities
even upon persons not within the allegiance of the United States for con-
duct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders. Section
98(2) of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition declares the
Act applicable "to all restraints of competition which have effect in the
area in which this Act applies, even if they result from acts done outside
such area."
These tools may be sufficient in dealing with international trade of
national firms, but they are not effective enough for the control of inter-
national firms. This task asks for more than the international application
of domestic laws; it requires the cooperation of the national governments
in the field of international antitrust enforcement. Unfortunately, this is a
field where very little has been achieved so far.
Several attempts to establish a coordination of policies have failed.
The Havana Charter had the aim "to prevent business practices among com-
mercial enterprises which restrain competition, restrict access to markets, or
foster monopolistic control in international trade."'12 It was accepted in
OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY (prepared for the Privy Council
Office 1968).
O ld. at 36.
7 Here the example of France may be cited which has so far strongly objected to the
market entrance of foreign firms.
8 Germany is principally open to foreign firms entering the domestic market. Some-
times, however, warning voices can be heard against excessive foreign investment. Thus,
in 1966 the German government held that Texaco's merger with the German firm DEA
would be undesirable. The merger was, however, later accomplished. The same is true for
Canada. The essence of the Watkins Report was the concern that Canadian industry was
dominated by foreign firms.
9 This has caused a number of countries to introduce legislation which obliges inter-
national firms to appoint nationals to the board of domestic subsidiaries. Examples are
Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland.
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
11 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
12HAAVANA CHARTER art. 46. See also C. EDWARDS, CONTROL OF CARTELS AND MONOPOLIES
230 (1967).
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1948 by representatives of 53 countries, but did not materialize in the end
because opposition had become so strong that ratification was impossible.
A similar project, initiated by the United Nations Economic and Social
Council in 1951, was likewise without result. After some first positive reac-
tions in the United Nations the plan failed, since the differences in national
policies and practices were held to be of such magnitude that the agreement
would neither be satisfactory nor effective in accomplishing its purpose.'8
The most recent step undertaken in this field is the recommendation
adopted by the Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) member countries on October 5, 1967.14 It provides
for a notification procedure under which a country undertaking an investi-
gation or a proceeding gives notice to another member country if its in-
terests are involved, and for an exchange of information on restrictive busi-
ness practices in international trade as far as is permitted by the national
laws and legitimate interests. Lastly, the OECD member countries are asked
to coordinate their efforts in dealing with international restrictive business
practices on a fully voluntary basis.
It is still too early to assess the efficacy of this recommendation, but
there are two points which make the recommendation a good and useful
beginning for the aims for which it is intended. Firstly, it does not super-
impose a new international legislation in the manner of the Havana Charter
which could not possibly fit all the different national antitrust ideologies,
but leaves each country with its own legislation and its own approach to
antitrust. Secondly, the cooperation is voluntary. This may require a certain
degree of conviction on the part of the countries involved in a given case
where the recommendation is to be applied. The important factor, however,
is that no member country feels obliged or bound to act; it is left at its free
will.
Hopefully this recommendation is a first step towards a closer inter-
national cooperation which may one day even lead to an international
charter. With the further increase in the number and importance of inter-
national firms this will one day be a necessity.
II
Specific problems are being put forward by the growth of conglomerate
firms, both national and international. For the purpose of this paper a
conglomerate firm will be defined as that kind of an enterprise which is
involved in the production, distribution and/or sale of goods or services
that have no direct economic relation to one another.15 A conglomerate firm
may come into existence after a period of internal growth through the in-
13 C. EDWARDS, supra note 12, at 233-35.
14 See CouNcIL or THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
COOPERATION BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES ON RESTRITIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES AFFECTING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1967).
15 Stelzer, Antitrust Policy and the Conglomerates, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 196 (1969).
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vestment of available funds in lines of manufacturing or trade other than
the previous ones or after successful mergers.
As to antitrust legislation and policy, internal growth of firms has for a
long period of time not been regarded to present a problem. Indeed, rein-
vestment of profits in order to expand production or to enter new markets
was looked upon as being the prime source of successful stimulation of com-
petitive processes and of the achievement of remarkable rates of economic
growth. There was, of course, the inherent danger of monopolizing, but the
history of antitrust shows that there were only few, though spectacular,
cases that had actually led to antitrust litigation.
This is quite different with mergers. A merger will ex definitione lead
to the economic disappearance of a formerly independent company. In
cases where the acquired firm is entirely integrated into the acquiring firm,
the acquired company will also disappear as a legal unit.
The antitrust implications differ according to the direction in which
the merger has occurred. The general attitude of antitrust authorities
towards mergers has never been positive, even if disapproval was not ex-
pressed publicly. Negative statements were most likely in instances of
horizontal mergers. In such cases changes of market structures conducive to
competition were taking place and changes of the conduct of individual
firms had to be anticipated. Even though an unambiguous and determinate
relationship between market structure and market conduct of firms cannot
be established generally, it is fairly consistent with economic experience to
assume that concentration of markets tends to discourage price competition.
Additionally, patterns of conduct will be encouraged that will lead to
economically unsound results, as for example, excessive promotional expen-
ditures or the preservation of outdated methods of production.
Because of these reasons borderlines beyond which horizontal mergers
would very probably lead to detrimental competitional effects could be
defined rather easily. Sections 4-10 of the American Merger Guidelines1 6
deal with this sort of concentration. In sections 5 and 6 the antitrust division
announced fairly precise figures to define critical market shares beyond
which a merger will ordinarily be challenged.
In Germany the second amendment to the Law Against Restraint of
Competition will probably be submitted to the Bundestag (Federal Par-
liament) in 1970. One of the major propositions of this amendment is the
provisions for merger control. The main criterion to initiate deconcentra-
tion litigation against a particular merger will be the competitive situation
in the affected market. Mergers which will create a dominating position (or
"monopoly," in American legal terms) may face divestiture proceedings.
Since legal provisions of this sort will be new in Germany, it seems likely
that horizontal mergers will first be challenged. According to a survey, con-
16 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES Nos. 4-10, in 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
4430, at 6683-85 (1968) [hereinafter cited as MERGER GUIDELINES].
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ducted by the National Economic Research Associates, Inc. (NERA) within
the United States, some 40 percent of the respondents thought that the en-
forcement of anti-merger legislation as demonstrated in the Merger Guide-
lines of the Department of Justice will limit future plans for horizontal
mergers severely; only 15 percent of the respondents did not feel affected
at all.17 Due to the lack of similar legislation, no such figures are available
for Germany.
It is more difficult to conclusively assess the impact of vertical mergers,
i.e., acquisitions of firms at the supplying or at the purchasing side of the
acquiring company. Market-share considerations alone would not help to
determine whether the particular vertical merger might be harmful. Anti-
competitive consequences could be expected to occur, however, whenever
a vertical acquisition either tends significantly to raise barriers to entry in
either market or to disadvantage existing non-integrated firms in either
market in ways unrelated to economic efficiency18
It is apparent that market shares by themselves cannot provide a satis-
factory and objective standard of measurement so that both the administra-
tion and the courts will have a wider scope to exert their discretion. Even if
market shares are taken into consideration as objective standards, non-
market share standards, such as the conditions of entry, can hardly be
measured unambiguously, so that the overall assessment will lack absolute
determinateness.
Allowing for the wider scope of different interpretations, the business
community feels less limited in its merging opportunities. Only some 17
percent of the respondents of the NERA survey felt severely restricted, as
opposed to 40 percent claiming such restriction under American Guidelines
for horizontal mergers.
Another set of problems is brought about by mergers of companies
that did not compete with each other or did not stand in a buyer-seller
relationship because of different products and/or because of different
geographical markets (market extension merger). "A major issue is whether
diversified firms, which take the merger route to grow, enjoy unique ad-
vantages over smaller single product competitors."' 19
At first sight conglomerate mergers do not seem to have any antitrust
relevance. The classical analysis of monopoly and oligopoly behavior
cannot be used to analyze the behaviour of multi-product firms. Further-
more, the profit maximizing principle has been replaced by a system of
subsidization.2 0 Through the establishment of such a system conglomerate
17 NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES INC., CORPORATE REACTION TO THE MERGER
GUIDELINES (1969). It was assumed that the sample was statistically significant.
18 See MERGER GUIDELINES No. 11, at 6685.
19 E. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMIcs 259 (1968).
20 See id. at 260-66. According to Singer, subsidization occurs as the equalization of
profit rates, as a compensation for a loss, and in relation to the "price squeezing" of non-
integrated independents.
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mergers might gain relevance for the particular single markets. Having the
backing of the diversified firm, every dependent company belonging to that
firm will be enabled to make use of the advantages of "conglomerate
power."21
It is true that unambiguous firm standards cannot be set up according
to which future conglomerate mergers may be evaluated. This is one of the
reasons why the American Merger Guidelines are cautiously saying only
that there are two categories of conglomerate mergers which are sufficiently
identifiable in terms of their anticompetitive effects: mergers involving
potential entrants and mergers creating a danger of reciprocal buying.22
Also, by conglomerate acquisition the market power of the acquired firm
or the acquiring firm could be considerably enlarged.
The Antitrust Division uses the market share basis to come to some
sort of an objective standard. Since the other standards are essentially quali-
tative statements (mergers to prevent "disturbances" or "disruptions") the
business community is least impressed by the guidelines concerning con-
glomerates. According to the NERA survey a mere 4 percent felt severely
limited, while 43 percent believed that they were not affected at all.
The main danger of extensive movements of conglomerate mergers seems
to be the growing number and intensity of links between a few hundred
huge corporations which have now already obtained the power to influence
competitive processes in particular markets.2 3 This poses a basic threat to
our economic system. Once the political decision in favour of a market
economy as the system of coordination and control of productive factors
and commodities and services has been made, freedom of competition
should be maintained at any rate.
This statement also has social and political consequences. Large corpo-
rate power is essentially without democratic control. This is especially true
when diversified and linked-up corporations are powerful enough to steer
market processes according to their will. The idea does not only worry
radical students that there might be a few hundred vast firms in the end
that effectively control the economies of North America, Western Europe
and Japan without being subject to workable control.
There is, however, quite a number of economists that could not go along
with the basic idea that has been expressed above. Irwin Stelzer said as a
conclusion to his remarks on antitrust policy and the conglomerates: "It
is not at all clear whether the open economic society which is generally ac-
cepted as a legitimate goal can best be achieved by opposing or permitting
this form of asset turnover." 24 Similar were the misgiving of Commissioner
Jones of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC):
21 C. EDWARDS, supra note 12.
22 See MERGER GUIDELINES Nos. 17-20, at 6687-89.
23 BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, ECONOMIC RtPorT ON CORPORATE MERGERS 5-9 (1969).
24 Id. at 11.
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There should be no illusion that Phase Two of the Study [i.e., the 1969
Economic Report on Corporate Mergers by the FTC] will present the last
word on the economic performance of conglomerates, or even that the light
it sheds on such questions as efficiency, innovation, and use and abuse of
market power will furnish definitive answers to the competitive impact of
conglomerate mergers.25
It seems to me that both parties are talking about different categories.
Stelzer and Jones wondered whether the anti-competitive impact of a par-
ticular single conglomerate merger is really such that legal action should
be taken, because the merger might have positive aspects. The FTC, on the
other hand, thought of what is going to happen when after a large scale
conglomerate merging (quantitative aspect) a new market situation (qualita-
tive change) has emerged, when workable competition will have been re-
placed by the planning and market control of giant, diversified corpora-
tions. Looking back from this point of final development, all the possible
aspects of approval of individual mergers must appear to be highly irrel-
evant.
III
It is obvious that conglomerate mergers also play an important role
with international firms. This is especially true as most international mergers
are of the conglomerate type even if a horizontal international merger ap-
pears to have taken place.
These conglomerates pose the same actual or potential danger to free-
dom of international markets as do the national conglomerates to the
national markets. 26 An international anti-merger legislation, similar to that
in the United States, is desirable.
Considering the difficulties of past international antitrust activities and
legislation it does not appear possible to make all nations concerned agree
on a common system of merger control. This will certainly apply to Eu-
ropean States where there is a common belief that European corporations
are considerably smaller in absolute terms than their American competitors.
It might, however, be feasible to agree on something like a "negative"
approach. If it is not possible to restrict active mergers by national firms,
it might be possible to prevent domestic firms from being acquired by large
international combines. To avoid the arousal of nationalistic feelings among
European nations27 it might be advisable to agree on common anti-merger
251d. at XVII.
26 I would just like to mention the problems to determine market shares of inter-
national firms in their various single markets.
27 For example, the latent hostility of Europeans to see their growth industries being
taken over, or the troubles with the FIAT-Citroen merger, or with the proposed GBAG-
CFP (oil industry) merger. These hostile emotions are particularly remarkable, because all
the countries concerned (France, Germany, Italy) are members of the ECSC and the
Common Market. This shows that even close economic cooperation of national states
does not prevent national governments from discretionarily using their influence and
power against mergers between corporations of member countries. Companies of member
770 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
guidelines, indicating explicitly when national governments should con-
tradict.
countries might even be discriminated against: The German Federal Ministry of Eco-
nomics did not finally object to the Texaco-DEA merger; a short time later the French
CFP was not allowed to acquire a considerable share of the GBAG stock; and now the
Ministry approved of the Gulf-Frisia merger.
